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Abstract 
In the academic field of international stock market, some critics argue that, after 
having a global financial crisis, stock markets around the world will become more 
integrated. In fact, many researchers have put forward empirical works showing that 
the co-relation, or Granger-Causality, among different stock markets, strengthens 
comparatively at the post crisis period. This finding is rational; however, the 
explanation given for the increased co-movement after the crisis is not sufficient. The 
critics suggest that this increase is caused by the increase in international arbitrage 
activities and the higher degree of integration among markets. The Purpose of this 
paper is to illustrate that the two explanations given are not adequate to explain the 
co movement of the markets. The researcher will therefore suggest a more reasonable 
explanation for the stronger post crisis co-movement, which is the unusual high 
sensitivity of investors to the international financial news. 
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1. Introduction   
Academic literature empirically found that stock markets, globally, experienced a 
higher co-movement after previous financial crashes. For instance, Lau and McInish 
(1993) proved that, the average pair wise co-relation between stock markets, tripled 
after the 1987 market crash. Arshanapalli, Doukas and Lang (1995) showed that, in 
total, 7 stock markets had co-integration relationship during the post crisis period of 
the 1987 market crash; this relationship was not present before the crisis occurred.  
Yang, Kolari and Min (2003) found that, co-integration among ten major 
international markets existed after the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) which were not 
present before. Cheng and Glascock (2006) suggested that the Granger Causality 
among the performance of the U.S. and other 3 Asian stock markets had strengthened 
after the Asian Financial Crisis. Meric, Kim, (2008) applied the principal component 
analysis, to study 8 major stock markets, and the findings suggested that the 
contemporaneous co-movement among those eight markets became closer, after the 
911 attack. 
 
From the above-mentioned literature, a critical inconsistency was found as follows:  
If co-movement is really strengthened after a financial crisis, how do you explain the 
fact that there was a co-integration in post 1987 market crash period, but not in pre 
AFC period? This suggests that the co-movement only become stronger immediately 
after crises, but diminishes after a long period. Hence, the intensive co-movement 
after crises is just a short run phenomenon. 
 
Another discrepancy is that the explanation given is not clear. Arshanapalli, Doukas 
and Lang (1995) argued that the post crisis co-movement was due to increased 
arbitrage activities but he did not give any detailed explanation. Now, with the use of 
the Arbitrage Pricing Theory developed by Stephen Ross (1976), I will extend the 
above reasoning. APT dictates that different well diversified portfolios with the same 
sensitivity to economic factors should have the same price. Since there are thousands 
of securities in the market, investors can create another well diversified portfolios 
with the same sensitivity to economic factors, provided that the number of securities 
greatly out- number the economic factors. If we think the market indexes of different 
countries are well diversified portfolios, and we create a different well diversified 
portfolios with the same sensitivity by using those market index; once these same 
sensitivity portfolio‟s price diverge, arbitrage will immediately restore the portfolios 
to the same price, causing the co-movement. However, the main question is, why are 
these arbitrage activities only increased after a crisis? They could have occurred 
before crisis. In fact, some cross-sectional empirical studies, covering China suggest 
that it is inconsistent to argue that the arbitrage activities will increase after crisis for 
a country adopted capital control. In other words, the “increased arbitrage” 
explanation is problematic. Cheng and Glascock (2006), on the other hand, believes 
that a stronger co-movement means there was a high degree of market integration, 
However, market integration is a continuous process, and therefore, it is pointless to 
use this factor, as a justification for the increased co-movement in markets  after 
financial crisis.  Moreover, this explanation is contradictory to the fact that the co-
movement was strong after 1987 but weak before AFC. It is hard to argue that the 
market integrated after 1987 but disintegrate before 1997. Therefore, this explanation 
is also not satisfied.  
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In this paper, two global financial crises, the Asian Financial Crisis and the Sub-
prime Crisis, will be analyzed. If a crisis can really lead to long term market 
integration, and then the pre Sub-prime Crisis period co-movement must be at least 
as strong as post AFC period. If the co-movement in the post AFC was stronger than 
both the pre AFC and pre Sub-prime Crisis period, we can conclude that the co-
movement after a crisis, is only a phenomenon which will fade shortly. And as such, 
we will need to find another reasonable explanation for the co-movement. 
 
 
2. Methodology 
The study of the co-movement between different stock markets contains two parts. 
The first part is to test whether they shared a common trend, i.e. the co-integration. 
The Pair wise augmented Engle-Granger two step approach is used for testing the co-
integration of each pair of indexes. Co-integration requires the series of each indexes 
to be I (1), and the residual of the linear combination of the pairs to be I (0). An 
existence of co-integration implies that, the two indexes have a long run relationship. 
 
The second part of the co-movement study is analyzing the short run relationship; 
this is done by using Granger Causality test. If two indexes are co-integrated, the 
Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) will be applied, otherwise the Akaike 
Information Criterion (VAR) will be used, since it is inconsistent to use ordinary 
VAR for co-integrated variables (Greene 2003: 654-655). The optimal lag is selected 
by the AIC, and the maximum lag is eight. Therefore, we should have the following 
relationship matrix. 
 
 Co-integrated 
Not Co-
integrated 
Granger 
Causality 
Long run relationship, and short run relationship 
is direct and clear. 
Only short run 
relationship. 
No Granger 
Causality 
Long run relationship, but short run relationship 
is not direct and clear (may be due to missing 
variables). This is because theoretically co-
integration implies Granger Causality. 
No long run and 
short run 
relationship. 
 
The following data of the four identical periods before and after the financial crises 
will be used to study the co-movement before and after the crises. The data is 
approximately 2 and half years before and after each crisis. 
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 Start  End 
# of 
observations 
Pre Asian 
Financial Crisis 
Jan 1995 June 1997 651 
Post Asian 
Financial Crisis 
July 1997 - Hong Kong 
handover to China 
Dec 1999 - 1 month 
after Hong Kong 
government sold the 
Tracker Fund 
654 
Pre Sub-prime 
Mortgage Crisis 
Jan 2005 June 2007 650 
Post Sub-prime 
Mortgage Crisis 
July 2007 - it is hard to 
define a clear cut for 
the starting point of 
Sub-prime Crisis. But 
according to the Sub-
prime Timeline in 
Journal of Applied 
Finance, the average 
foreclosure filings 
jumped sharply in July 
2007. 
Nov 2009 - One Month 
after Ben Bernanke, 
Chairman of the US 
Federal Reserve, 
proclaimed that the 
crisis may come to an 
end. 
616 
 
 
3. Data 
Five stock market indexes are included; The , FTSE 100, Hang Seng Index, Nikkie 
225 average, Shanghai SE A-share Index and S&P 500. The Observations frequency 
is daily and data are draw from Data Stream Advance. 
 
 
4. Empirical Results 
 
4.1 Unit Root and Co-integration  
Table 1 shows the result of ADF unit root test. Although stock indexes are commonly 
assumed to be I (1), i.e. integrate order 1, FTSE and HIS were I (0) during the pre 
Sub-prime Crisis period. Alongside them, all the series are I (1). 
 
Table 2 to Table 5 shows the results of augmented Engle-Granger two step co-
integration test for all the I (1) pairs. Since the co-integration test in the table should 
be symmetric, only the upper triangle shows the statistics. Because all four periods 
included more than 600 observations, we have quite a big sample, as such; a 5% 
significant level is used as a standard. Table 2 shows that there were 8 co-integrated 
pairs at the pre AFC periods; however in table 3, the number of co-integrated pairs 
dropped to 6. This means that, in terms of long run, the relationships between stock 
markets after the AFC, were actually farther apart, therefore, they tended to have 
different long run trend. 
 
Table 4 shows that, the number of co-integrated pairs dropped to 1 during the pre 
Sub-prime Crisis period, this was partly because, statistically FTSE and HSI were I 
(0) in this interval. So the long run relationships were loose. Nevertheless, the 
number of co-integrated pairs sharply increased to nine, after the Sub-prime crisis, as 
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shown in Table 5. The summary of the 4 tables revealed that, the number of co-
integrated pairs did not certainly increase or decrease after a crisis. Therefore, we 
cannot conclude that global crisis will make the long run relationship between 
international markets closer or looser because the long run relationship may depend 
on some factors other than the crises. 
 
4.2 Granger Causality 
The Crisis did have an impact on the short run co-movement of the stock markets as 
the number of Granger Causalities between the markets had increased immediately 
after the crises. Table 6 shows that before the AFC, there were only 5 Granger 
Causalities, and most of the causal relationships were from S&P and FTSE 
unilaterally. Table 7, however, shows that the number of Granger Causalities doubled, 
to 10, after the crisis. Also, the relationships became more mutual as, the S&P and 
FTSE, Granger caused, other Asian indexes, like HSI and SHA also Granger caused 
even the S&P or FTSE. 
 
The Sub-prime Crisis had a similar effect. Before the Sub-prime Crisis, there were 
only 7 Granger Causalities, as shown in Table 8; this was even less than the post 
AFC period. Most of these casualties are unilaterally from S&P and FTSE to others. 
However, as Table 9, shows, the number of Granger Causalities jumped to 13 
immediately after the crisis; while the S&P and FTSE Granger caused an impact on 
NIKKIE, HSI and SHA also had Granger causal impact on others. 
 
In summary, from the Granger Causality test results we can conclude that a crisis 
actually can make the short run co-movement between markets tighter. This effect, 
however, fades out in the long run.  
 
4.3 Analysis of the Empirical Results 
The co-integration test proves that the long run co-movement relationships between 
markets are NOT affected by the crises; but by some other factors. The Granger 
Causality test suggested that immediately after a crisis the short run co-movement 
between markets became closer. However, this phenomenon is very short and cannot 
persist, and therefore, the “market integration” and “increase arbitrage activities” 
explanations are inconsistent with the empirical evidence. If market really became 
more integrated, and arbitrage activities were stronger after a crisis, the tighter co-
movement should have persisted since they were long run effects. However, the 
tighter co-movement only lasted for a short period, so this phenomenon should be 
attributed to some short run factors. 
 
Another fact which makes the “market integration” and “increase arbitrage 
activities” explanations unacceptable is that SHA was Granger caused by S&P and 
FTSE in the post Sub-prime Crisis period; however, it is hard to engage in large 
amount of arbitrage activities in markets with capital control. Although Ma and Sun 
(2007) suggested that there was substantial amount of overseas hot money inflow to 
China since 2003, according to Arbitrage Pricing Theory the short run co-movement 
of the stock indexes between China and other regions required an extremely flexible 
and large sum of capital. In other words, the strengthened co-movement of SHA with 
other indexes after the Sub-prime Crisis had to be caused by other factors. 
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5. A Reasonable Explanation 
This paper suggests that the strong co-movement after a crisis is caused by the 
unusual high sensitivity of investors to international financial news instead of market 
integration or the increase in arbitrage activities. This argument is consistent with the 
ambiguity aversion theory, developed by Fox and Tversky (1995). The theory argues 
that, when people face uncertainty, they only concentrate on less ambiguous events, 
and ignore ambiguous events. When applying this theory to international financial 
crisis, we acknowledge that first the uncertainty people face is extremely high during 
a crisis. For example, during this time, people cannot estimate the fundamental 
elements confidently and they become highly risk averse. Second, there is a great 
abundance of critical financial news, flooded around the world during a crisis; 
therefore, investors, during a financial distress, may become more ambiguous averse   
about the events to come. They tend to accept unambiguous information, such as 
short term information about the index movement of other markets. Because of this, 
Stock markets worldwide will be affected by the same set of news. As a result, 
different markets fluctuate the same way, even though fundamentally they do not 
have strong connections.  
 
 
6. Implication 
To conclude, this paper shows that investors tend to be ambiguous and extremely 
sensitive to news immediately after a crisis. However, investors who are sensitive to 
bad news are also sensitive to good news. During a crisis, the policy makers could 
act wisely in order to send appropriate information to public and restore the 
confidence. If policy makers allow people to overreact to bad news, asset markets 
will overshoot to the downside. Wealth effect and damage multiplier will transform a 
financial market crash to a real economic crisis. 
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Appendix I: 
 
Table 1: Augmented Dickey-Fuller‟s Unit Root Test;  P-value 
 Jan 95 - June 97 
July 97 - Dec 
99 
Jan 05 - June 07 July 07 - Nov 09 
lnFTSE I(1) I(1) I(0) I(1) 
Level(intercept and 
trend) 
0.4596 0.1895 0.0480** 0.9512 
1
st
 difference 
(intercept) 
0.0000*** 0.0000*** N/A 0.0000*** 
     
lnHSI I(1) I(1) I(0) I(1) 
Level(intercept and 
trend) 
0.1099 0.8247 0.0278** 0.9016 
1
st
 difference 
(intercept) 
0.0000*** 0.0000*** N/A 0.0000*** 
     
lnNIKKIE I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) 
Level(intercept and 
trend) 
0.6017 0.5858 0.4172 0.9079 
1
st
 difference 
(intercept) 
0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
     
lnSHA I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) 
Level(intercept and 
trend) 
0.3895 0.4854 0.7548 0.9591 
1
st
 difference 
(intercept) 
0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
     
lnSP I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) 
Level(intercept and 
trend) 
0.1531 0.0620 0.0688 0.9678 
1
st
 difference 
(intercept) 
0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
*** significant at the 1% level   ** significant at the 5% level 
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Table 2: Augmented Engle-Granger Two Step Co-integration Test (none) Jan 1995 -
June 1997; P-value 
       
 
 
lnFTSE lnHSI lnNIKKEI lnSHA lnS&P 
lnFTSE 
 
 0.0009*** 0.2997 0.0031*** 0.0012*** 
lnHIS 
 
  0.3566 0.0296** 0.0000*** 
lnNIKKEI 
 
   0.0150** 0.0459** 
lnSHA 
 
    0.0158** 
lnS&P 
 
     
*** significant at the 1% level   ** significant at the 5% level 
 
 
Table 3: Augmented Engle-Granger Two Step Co-integration Test (none) July 1997 - 
Dec 1999; P-value 
       
 
 
lnFTSE lnHSI lnNIKKEI lnSHA lnS&P 
lnFTSE 
 
 0.0633 0.0435** 0.0214** 0.0005*** 
lnHIS 
 
  0.0001*** 0.1056 0.0871 
lnNIKKEI 
 
   0.0671 0.0332** 
lnSHA 
 
    0.0209** 
lnS&P 
 
     
*** significant at the 1% level   ** significant at the 5% level 
 
 
Table 4: Augmented Engle-Granger Two Step Co-integration Test (none) Jan 2005 –  
June 2007; P-value 
       
 
 
lnFTSE lnHSI lnNIKKEI lnSHA lnS&P 
lnFTSE 
 
 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
lnHIS 
 
  N/A N/A N/A 
lnNIKKEI 
 
   0.0758 0.0993 
lnSHA 
 
    0.0036*** 
lnS&P 
 
     
*** significant at the 1% level   ** significant at the 5% level 
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Table 5: Augmented Engle-Granger Two Step Co-integration Test (none) July 2007 -
Nov   2009; P-value 
       
 
 
lnFTSE lnHSI lnNIKKEI lnSHA lnS&P 
lnFTSE 
 
 0.0091*** 0.0026*** 0.0244** 0.0000*** 
lnHIS 
 
  0.0025*** 0.0213** 0.0164** 
lnNIKKEI 
 
   0.0048*** 0.0013*** 
lnSHA 
 
    0.0579 
lnS&P 
 
     
*** significant at the 1% level   ** significant at the 5% level 
 
 
Table 6: Pair wise Granger Causality Jan 1995 - June 1997 P-value; VECM - if two 
variables are co-integrated. 1
st
 difference VAR - if two variables are not co-integrated 
(use level if variables are I(0) at the beginning) 
                      Excluded 
 
Dependent 
lnFTSE lnHSI lnNIKKEI lnSHA lnS&P 
lnFTSE 
 
 
0.0015*** 
(VECM) 
0.7577 
0.0602 
(VECM) 
0.0000*** 
(VECM) 
lnHIS 
 
0.0038*** 
(VECM) 
 0.0070 
0.6947 
(VECM) 
0.0000*** 
(VECM) 
lnNIKKEI 
 
0.0090*** 0.6064  
0.8895 
(VECM) 
0.0000 
(VECM 
lnSHA 
 
0.6724 
(VECM) 
0.9699 
(VECM) 
0.2749 
(VECM) 
 
0.9974 
(VECM) 
lnS&P 
 
0.5491 
(VECM) 
0.7977 
(VECM) 
0.3877 
(VECM) 
0.0510 
(VECM) 
 
**** significant at the 1% level   ** significant at the 5% level 
 
 
Table 7: Pair wise Granger Causality July 1997 - Dec 1999 P-value; VECM - if two 
variables are co-integrated. 1
st
 difference VAR - if two variables are not co-integrated 
(use level if variables are I(0) at the beginning) 
                      Excluded 
 
Dependent 
lnFTSE lnHSI lnNIKKEI lnSHA lnS&P 
lnFTSE 
 
 0.0014*** 
0.0739 
(VECM) 
0.0479** 
(VECM) 
0.0000*** 
(VECM) 
lnHIS 
 
0.0000***  
0.9802 
(VECM) 
0.0046*** 0.0000*** 
lnNIKKEI 
 
0.0000*** 
(VECM) 
0.5701 
(VECM) 
 0.7455 
0.0000*** 
(VECM) 
lnSHA 
 
0.3409 
(VECM) 
0.3142 0.0998  
0.9938 
(VECM) 
lnS&P 
 
0.0083*** 
(VECM) 
0.0179** 
0.3391 
(VECM) 
0.0664 
(VECM) 
 
*** significant at the 1% level   ** significant at the 5% level 
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Table 8: Pair wise Granger Causality Jan 2005 - June 2007 P-value; VECM - if two 
variables are co-integrated. 1
st
 difference VAR - if two variables are not co-integrated 
(use level if variables are I(0) at the beginning) 
                      Excluded 
 
Dependent 
lnFTSE lnHSI lnNIKKEI lnSHA lnS&P 
lnFTSE 
 
 
0.2588 
 
0.1834 0.0712 0.0000*** 
lnHIS 
 
0.0000*** 
 
 0.3496 0.8785 0.0000*** 
lnNIKKEI 
 
0.0000*** 
 
0.1026  0.7041 0.0000*** 
lnSHA 
 
0.0006*** 0.0069*** 0.2696  
0.8804 
(VECM) 
lnS&P 
 
0.2295 0.1222 0.8752 
0.8150 
(VECM) 
 
*** significant at the 1% level   ** significant at the 5% level 
 
 
Table 9: Pair wise Granger Causality July 2007 - Nov 2009 P-value; VECM - if two 
variables are co-integrated. 1
st
 difference VAR - if two variables are not co-integrated 
(use level if variables are I(0) at the beginning) 
      Excluded 
 
Dependent 
lnFTSE lnHSI lnNIKKEI lnSHA lnS&P 
lnFTSE 
 
 0.4259 
(VECM) 
0.0011*** 
(VECM) 
0.2486 
(VECM) 
0.0000*** 
(VECM) 
lnHIS 
 
0.0000*** 
(VECM) 
 0.0041*** 
(VECM) 
0.0050*** 
(VECM) 
0.0000*** 
(VECM) 
lnNIKKEI 
 
0.0000*** 
(VECM) 
0.0000*** 
(VECM) 
 0.3271 
(VECM) 
0.0000*** 
(VECM) 
lnSHA 
 
0.0020*** 
(VECM) 
0.4651 
(VECM) 
0.0643 
(VECM) 
 0.0000*** 
 
lnS&P 
 
0.0454** 
(VECM) 
0.5044 
(VECM) 
0.0221** 
(VECM) 
0.5505  
*** significant at the 1% level   ** significant at the 5% level 
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Abbreviations 
lnFTSE – Natural logarithm form of FTSE 100 Index denominated in U.S. dollar. 
 
lnHSI –Natural logarithm form of Hang Seng Index denominated in U.S. dollar. 
 
lnNikkie –Natural logarithm form of Nikkie 225 Stock Average Index denominated 
in U.S. dollar 
 
lnSHA –Natural logarithm form of Shanghai Stock Exchange A Shares Index 
denominated in U.S. dollar. 
 
lnS&P –Natural logarithm form of Standard & Poor‟s 500 Composite Index 
denominated in U.S. dollar. 
AFC – Asian Financial Crisis. 
 
VAR – Vector Auto-regression. 
 
VECM – Vector Error Correction Model. 
 
AIC – Akaike Information Criterion 
 
 
Graphs: 
 
Figure 1: Indexes movement Jan 1995 – June 1997 in natural logarithm form 
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Figure 2: Indexes movement July 1997 – Dec 1999 in natural logarithm form 
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Figure 3: Indexes movement Jan 2005 – June 2007 in natural logarithm form 
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Figure 4: Indexes movement July 2007 – Nov 2009 in natural logarithm form 
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